24 March 2011
Calling a Spade a Spade
Bravo Zulu to Rep. Tom McClintock


March 23, 2011

The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have read your letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate dated March 21, 2011 concerning your order that United States Armed Forces attack the nation of Libya. You cite the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and your “constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”

The Constitution clearly and unmistakably vests Congress with the sole prerogative “to declare war.” Your letter fails to explain how a resolution of the United Nations Security Council is necessary to commit this nation to war but that an act of Congress is not.

The United Nations Participation Act expressly withholds authorization for the President to commit United States Armed Forces to combat in pursuit of United Nations directives without specific Congressional approval. The War Powers Resolution states that the President’s power to engage United States Armed Forces in hostilities “shall not be inferred . . .from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities…”

The War Powers Resolution unambiguously defines three circumstances under which the President as Commander in Chief may order United States Armed Forces into hostile action: “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” Your letter cites none of these conditions.

Nor can the power to order an act of war be inferred from the President’s authority as “Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.” The Constitution’s Framers were explicit on this point. In Federalist 69, Alexander Hamilton draws a sharp distinction between the President’s authority as Commander in Chief as “nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces” and the authority of the British king “which extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies ~ all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.”

With all due respect, I can only conclude that your order to United States Armed Forces to attack the nation of Libya on March 19, 2011 is in direct violation of the War Powers Resolution and constitutes a usurpation of Constitutional powers clearly and solely vested in the United States Congress and is accordingly unlawful
and unconstitutional.

Sincerely,

Member of Congress

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23 March 2011
Libyan Insight
Libya, the West and the Narrative of Democracy.  Probably the best analysis, of Libya that I have read.  Bravo Zulu to George Friedman of STRATFOR.

BLUF Whenever you intervene in a country, whatever your intentions, you are intervening on someone’s side. In this case, the United States, France and Britain are intervening in favor of a poorly defined group of mutually hostile and suspicious tribes and factions that have failed to coalesce, at least so far, into a meaningful military force. The intervention may well succeed. The question is whether the outcome will create a morally superior nation. It is said that there can’t be anything worse than Gadhafi. But Gadhafi did not rule for 42 years because he was simply a dictator using force against innocents, but rather because he speaks to a real and powerful dimension of Libya.

I wish a few decision makers had George's insight.
According to the narrative, Gadhafi should quickly have been overwhelmed — but he wasn’t. He actually had substantial support among some tribes and within the army. All of these supporters had a great deal to lose if he was overthrown. Therefore, they proved far stronger collectively than the opposition, even if they were taken aback by the initial opposition successes. To everyone’s surprise, Gadhafi not only didn’t flee, he counterattacked and repulsed his enemies.

This should not have surprised the world as much as it did. Gadhafi did not run Libya for the past 42 years because he was a fool, nor because he didn’t have support. He was very careful to reward his friends and hurt and weaken his enemies, and his supporters were substantial and motivated. One of the parts of the narrative is that the tyrant is surviving only by force and that the democratic rising readily routs him. The fact is that the tyrant had a lot of support in this case, the opposition wasn’t particularly democratic, much less organized or cohesive, and it was Gadhafi who routed them.

As Gadhafi closed in on Benghazi, the narrative shifted from the triumph of the democratic masses to the need to protect them from Gadhafi — hence the urgent calls for airstrikes. But this was tempered by reluctance to act decisively by landing troops, engaging the Libyan army and handing power to the rebels: Imperialism had to be avoided by doing the least possible to protect the rebels while arming them to defeat Gadhafi. Armed and trained by the West, provided with command of the air by the foreign air forces — this was the arbitrary line over which the new government keeps from being a Western puppet. It still seems a bit over the line, but that’s how the story goes.

In fact, the West is now supporting a very diverse and sometimes mutually hostile group of tribes and individuals, bound together by hostility to Gadhafi and not much else. It is possible that over time they could coalesce into a fighting force, but it is far more difficult imagining them defeating Gadhafi’s forces anytime soon, much less governing Libya together. There are simply too many issues among them. It is, in part, these divisions that allowed Gadhafi to stay in power as long as he did. The West’s ability to impose order on them without governing them, particularly in a short amount of time, is difficult to imagine. They remind me of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, anointed by the Americans, distrusted by much of the country and supported by a fractious coalition.

Libya, the West and the Narrative of Democracy is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

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Who's Left Holding the Bag?
Everyone knows I have argued against any involvement in Libya and I stand by that position. There is no overriding national interest or imminent threat from Libya. This entire operation is a fool’s errand and I hope it leads to some major changes in our country.

I fail to understand how enforcing a Libyan “no-fly zone” involve air-to-ground combat missions against tanks and other ground vehicles. I’ll even take it a step further which is sure to draw some ire. How does enforcing a Libyan “no-fly zone” involve Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)? Let me explain my thoughts on this.

Creating a no-fly zone means establishing air supremacy. Air supremacy can be established through various means including, option 1) air-to-air combat or the destruction of enemy combat aircraft on the ground, option 2) destruction of runways and air logistic support primarily fuel storage, armaments, and maintenance facilities. Or it can mean option 3) shooting down enemy aircraft from stand-off positions using cruisers and destroyers armed with the Aegis Weapons System (AWS).

Options 1 and 2 require SEAD missions which involve expending large volumes of munitions and the risk of aircraft being shot down and pilots wounded or killed as well as recovery missions. Why in the world would we do any of that in this case? Why not use option 3, the AWS and shoot down any aircraft foolish enough to become airborne? Worst case you could always maintain a Hawkeye overhead with a CAP of F/A-18s out of the zone to shoot down anything that comes up. Heck, we did that every day in 1986 when we crossed the line-of-death taunting Khadafi on and it worked. I know, I was there.

Now, multiple countries are abandoning “Operation Odyssey Dawn” and the US is left holding the proverbial bag of dog sh#t because it really doesn't matter to anyone else. When will we wake up and smell the coffee?

I am hoping the law of unintended consequences kicks in and the American people decide this is the last straw. It’s time to clean our own house, quit trying to be the world’s police force and quit trying to nation build.

A house painter is always going to find that a house needs a new coat of paint. A mechanic is always going to find a problem that needs fixing. A cook is always going to say it needs a bit more salt and pepper. They all do it because it is their interest to do it. It is how they stay employed. Just like a consultant must always find something that can be done better to keep that paycheck coming.

Our defense department is no different. They are always going to find a war to get involved in because it is how they keep the paycheck coming. This is precisely why the founding fathers placed the military under civilian control. This is precisely why the CONGRESS has the power to declare war, not the president.

I took an oath to defend our country and I take it seriously. It is for that reason that I say enough is enough. It is time to reign in the military and those supporting perpetual war and continuous intervention in other countries business.

Our military forces are worn out and the country needs to rid itself of “perpetual conflict.” It’s time to say no more to the idiots in Washington. Our country is close to bankruptcy and we can’t keep borrowing against our grandchildren’s future.

I’m ready for peace and prosperity.

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18 March 2011
It Costs to Not Fly
Selected Options and Costs for a No-Fly Zone Over Libya

US policymakers and other world leaders have watched intently as civil war has erupted in Libya. In recent days, reports of air strikes on Libyan rebels and civilians have led some in the international community to call for a no-fly zone. Some argue that since US vital interests are not at stake, America should not become engaged in yet another military operation while the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq remain unresolved. There are also those who argue that given the United States’ declining fiscal position, those African and European states whose interests are directly involved in Libya should step-up and implement a no-fly zone. The Pentagon has weighed in, urging caution, and noting that the costs and difficulties of no-fly zones are generally higher than perceived.

What are some possible options and how much would each cost? The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates a 6 month No Fly Zone could cost as much as $9 billion.

"Full No-Fly Zone" covering all of Libya
  • $100 million to $300 million per week
  • Initial strike to secure airspace: $500 million and $1 billion
  • Six month total: $3.1 billion - $8.8 billion
  • Similar to no-fly zone imposed over Iraq (Operation Northern and Southern Watch)
Limited No-Fly Zone focusing on the northern third of Libya
  • $30 million to $100 million per week
  • Initial strike to secure airspace: $400 million to $800 million
  • Six month total $1.18 billion - $3.4 billion
Stand-off No-Fly Zone focusing on costal Libya with only air and naval assets beyond Libyan territory
  • $15 million to $25 million per week
  • Because this is strictly a stand-off operation with no assets in Libya, CSBA suggests no "initial cost."
  • Six month total $0.39 billion - $0.65 billion
  • This No-Fly zone would be enforced by three aegis-equipped destroyers.
  • These ships, supported by radar monitoring planes (AWACS), and land-based fighter aircraft would intercept violating aircraft from a distance with "over-the-horizon" missiles.
  • There is no historical precedent for this sort of no-fly zone.
The CSBA also estimates a 6 month No-Fly Zone could cost as much as $9 Billion. Here's a look at the costs of previous No-Fly Zones:
  • 3 months of air superiority over Serbia cost $2.4 billion
  • No Fly Zone over Iraq cost $1.3 billion per year
  • Libya is 6.5 times larger than the No Fly Zone over Iraq.

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02 March 2011
Unclear Mission, Uncertain Terminal Point.
If you don't read STRATFOR you should. Here is one of their free articles, it's on point.

Never Fight a Land War in Asia, George Friedman, STRATFOR.

BLUF:  "...Donald Rumsfeld once said, “You go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” I think that is a fundamental misunderstanding of war. You do not engage in war if the army you have is insufficient..."

Diplomacy for the United States is about maintaining the balance of power and using and diverting conflict to manage the international system. Force is the last resort, and when it is used, it must be devastating. The argument I have made, and which I think Gates is asserting, is that at a distance, the United States cannot be devastating in wars dependent on land power [in Asia]. That is the weakest aspect of American international power and the one the United States has resorted to all too often since World War II, with unacceptable results. Using U.S. land power as part of a combined arms strategy is occasionally effective in defeating conventional forces, as it was with North Korea (and not China) but is inadequate to the demands of occupation warfare. It makes too few troops available for success, and it does not know how many troops might be needed.

This is not a policy failure of any particular U.S. president. George W. Bush and Barack Obama have encountered precisely the same problem, which is that the forces that have existed in Eurasia, from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Korea to the Taliban in Afghanistan, have either been too numerous or too agile (or both) for U.S. ground forces to deal with. In any war, the primary goal is not to be defeated. An elective war in which the criteria for success are unclear and for which the amount of land force is insufficient must be avoided. That is Gates’ message. It is the same one MacArthur delivered, and the one Dwight Eisenhower exercised when he refused to intervene in Vietnam on France’s behalf. As with the Monroe Doctrine, it should be elevated to a principle of U.S. foreign policy, not because it is a moral principle but because it is a very practical one."

Never Fight a Land War in Asia is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

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The opinions shared in this blog are mostly mine and I make no apology for them!