Something to think about...from
Defense News
Gen. James Mattis
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command
By Vago Muradian
Published: 23 May 2010

Widely regarded as a man who blends a warrior ethos with a historically grounded intellect, U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Jim Mattis is noted for plain speaking about the brutal realities of war fighting.
Marine Gen. James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (M. Scott Mahaskey / Staff)
He led troops during the 2003 Iraq invasion and later worked with Army Gen. David Petraeus to develop the successful surge strategy there. Since 2007, he has headed the Joint Forces Command that shapes the training and operational concepts used by U.S. and allied troops. He says future wars will look different than today's as the lines between regular and irregular warfare blur, demanding more jointness, flexibility and coalitions.
Q. What are the real lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars?
A. War is a human endeavor, a social problem, and
we have modest expectations that technology is going to solve a problem as complex as warfare.
Second,
no war is over until the enemy says it's over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote, as we're often saying in the military.
** What do I take from this statement? Beating the enemy into submission or destroying him from the face of the earth is the only road to victory.
A third point is that what we cannot do is look towards war today as something that we are going to fight on our own. We are going to be fighting alongside allies of some stripe, and we are going to have to create a military that can easily adapt to other allies fighting alongside it as part of our formations, and perhaps us fighting as part of their formations.
But you can't simply transport the lessons from one theater, even one as recent as Iraq, directly to Afghanistan. It's its own country, the enemy is its own enemy, the terrain is different. Most importantly, the human terrain - the complexity of the human connections, the tribal relationships - is different.
Q. You're changing JFCom's name?
A. I've asked for that change: to Joint and Coalition Forces Command. That decision is not yet made.
Q. You and Petraeus changed how the Iraq war was fought. What did that teach you about change?
A. Gen. Petraeus and I came back from Iraq about the same time, he to Fort Leavenworth for the Army, me to Quantico for the Marines. We worked on this with our staffs, then he went back and changed the face of the war in Iraq. I did not go back as operational commander; I defer that success to him and the troops that were over there. I had at best an indirect, perhaps intellectual or training impact.
The real lessons you learn when you try to change an organization as big as ours is that the first thing you must do is define the problem. If you don't define the problem in very stark terms, then you're going to probably solve the wrong problem. We have too often in the 1990s, and perhaps into the first part of this decade, tried to solve the problem by calling things transforma tional or game-changers. We had not, I think, defined the problem well enough.
What Dave Petraeus and I had as an advantage was we were in the middle of a very clearly defined war in terms of the fact that the old ways weren't going to work. We looked for what was working, accumulated it into the doctrine and passed it out, largely written by NCOs and officers fresh from their searing experiences in Iraq.
Q. How do you ensure enough U.S. troops are trained in counterinsurgency so the same guys aren't repeatedly going to the war zone, while making sure they're trained in their technical specialties?
A. You have to marry your time. You need to bring troops who are skilled in the basics of military operations, then you apply those to the specific situation.
I don't know if there's a really good answer for you, but if I were to sum up what I've learned in 35 years of service, it's improvise, improvise, improvise. You have to be able to adapt on the fly because every enemy is different, and you're not going to know your enemy until you fight them. I don't care how many intel briefs you read, you don't know an enemy until you fight them. And once you start fighting them, then you recognize what the enemy's rhythms are, and you can work to throw those rhythms off course.
Q. And gauge how innovative and resilient they are?
A. That's part of it, but also: What are their fault lines? In the case of Iraq, we had an enemy that we knew in 2004 that we could isolate from the people, but it still took us years to get the enemy broken free of the people.
And for the first time in this war that we've been engaged in, we saw an Arab population turn against our common enemy. That was not because they loved us - they finally saw that we were the good guys, and the enemy, the way they were acting, were the bad guys.
I would also add that they were dumb. Sometimes wars are won by the side that makes the fewest mistakes, and the enemy made mistake after mistake after mistake. And we, on our side, when we saw we made a mistake, we corrected ourselves. And so the enemy is working amongst the population, and eventually the people identified that we were the ones doing things right and that the enemy was working against the people's best interest. So they turned on them.
Q. Petraeus suggested I ask you about commander-centric, network-enabled operations. What does that mean?
A. We want the best technology for our troops, but we want our leaders enabled by technology, not held back or suffocated, whose initiative is subordinated to a system. We want technology that enables them to do their job well.
Where technology improves the human interface, I'm all for it. Where it increases a commander's understanding, I'm all for it. But they must be able to fight without it.
You can take technology and drive so many of your concepts in line with that technology that you forget what you really set out to do. The human factors in war are much more difficult to measure but are much more important to the outcome. The technology must always serve the human beings in the war, not create a mechanistic approach in which "we serviced all these targets, and so we win." That's not the way war is won; history would disabuse us of that.
At Trafalgar, Britain's Adm. Nelson, with a handful of signals from his ship, changed the course of history. In World War I, that same Royal Navy, believing that technology had solved their problems, had selected higher officers based on their responsiveness to headquarters. When that fleet met the German High Seas Fleet at Jutland, they outgunned them, but that German fleet lived to fight another day and got the better of the British fleet. This is what happens when you believe that your leaders are less important than the technology.
Q. You want simulators to train small-units. Why has it taken so long?
A. I don't have a good answer for you. Since 1945, over 85 percent of our casualties, according to a study by Gen. Bob Scales of the U.S. Army, have come from infantry units. We have learned through aviation simulators and shipdriving simulators that we know how to use simulators. But for some reason, we have not used these to replicate the tactical and the ethical decision-making that our lads have to make in this close-quarters fight.
It's coming on line now; it's slower than I want, but it's coming on the right direction. The deputy secretary of defense has just signed a memo supporting us. The Marines at Camp Pendleton are already going through it, but the truth is we need dozens of these to replicate the demands of close combat.
Q. What training do troops need if the networks go down?
A. It's not if the nets go down but when they go down, because the enemy is going to try to take them down. There is no military in the world more vulnerable to losing its nets than the U.S. military because we are so reliant on them for our worldwide operations. We need to create a corps of officers who are comfortable with uncertainty and ensure that they can give commander's intent - broad guidance to their subordinates - so that when, not if, the nets go down, they can continue to operate at good speed, understanding what the commander needs done.
Q. What cultural change will that take?
A. We've raised a generation that, for the last nine years of active operations, have never been out of touch with their higher headquarters. What we're going to have to do is train by turning off the radios - as we did in the Cold War, when by pressing that handset key and transmitting, you were endangering yourself to the enemy's strikes on you. We're going to have to get used to turning off the handsets for other reasons: to see if people can operate on their own initiative.
Q. Do we still need four services?
A. I'm a strong believer that we need all four services, operating on their own domains, air, land, sea. We benefit by having the diversity of cultures that the Navy, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps bring. So long as those diverse cultures are matched by a spirit of collaboration and interoperability, it makes it very difficult for the enemy to fight us.
What we don't want is a U.S. Department of Defense that has a culture in which everyone has to think and fight the same way.
Q. What are your capability priorities?
A. No. 1, we must be able to fight in coalitions. No. 2, we must recognize that the information warfare, the battle for the hearts and minds of the global audience, is just as heavy a priority as the military operation itself and the tactical events on the battlefield must feed the narrative: that we are living up to our values, that while winning this fight, we are saving the innocent people that we are out there to protect.
Somehow, we've got to tie together the capabilities to win the information war, at the same time working with like-minded nations to keep these experiments we call democracy alive against people who really don't like them.
Q. Defense Secretary Robert Gates wants military commands to shrink. Can you do it and still operate effectively?
A. Absolutely. There are tried-and-tested methods: skip echelons is one - don't replicate every function every echelon; having fewer commands is actually better. I think we're on the right track to follow the secretary's lead right now, and it makes a lot of sense.
Labels: Common Sense, Warriors