
Precious to the Taliban, Kandahar is McChrystal's all-or-nothing gamble. It may not have been wise to announce in advance that he's betting the bank on the outcome.
It also would have been encouraging had our president, instead of checking the "Afghanistan box" with a six-hour night-time visit, spent just one full day in-country to see what our troops are doing. Obama logged four times as many hours in the air as he spent on the ground in Afghanistan.
Worse, Obama's darkness-shrouded drive-by sent a counter-productive message to our enemies, allies and regional observers: The US president's afraid to be on Afghan soil during daylight hours.
It's irrelevant whether his after-dusk arrival and post-midnight departure had to do with security concerns or just scheduling issues. He looked furtive. And appearances trump all.
Reportedly, the president read Karzai the riot act about the destructive corruption and ineptitude of his government. Nothing will come of it. The Karzai regime's too far gone. It isn't afflicted with corruption -- it's built on it.
Obama then chowed down with local luminaries, gave rear-echelon troops a 20-minute pep talk (complete with photo op) on the safest base in Afghanistan, and faded back into the night. That wham-bam-thank-you-Bagram visit was a perfect measure of the president's level of interest in a war to which he's sending 30,000 more men and women in uniform.
The good news? We're not only killing terrorists in Pakistan -- they're starting to kill each other. The bad news? Afghanistan isn't a war. It's a politically correct experiment -- conducted with our troops -- by an administration with higher priorities.
The letter sat on the dresser for four years.
Robert Gilbert never opened it. He only touched the envelope when he needed to dust around it. He wanted to give it back to his son unopened.
Every time his Marine son was deployed, his son would ask, "You still got my letter?"
His dad never wanted to read what was inside an envelope marked: "Dad, open this if I am wounded. Love, Robert."
The call to open it came March 8.
"Is Robert Gilbert there?" a voice from Marine headquarters in Quantico, Va., said.
"Junior or Senior?" Robert said.
"Senior."
The father felt his stomach drop even before he heard the words: "Your son has been injured in Afghanistan."
When he heard his son received "possibly a mortal wound," he sat on the bed, opened the yellow envelope and pulled out four handwritten pages of spiral notebook paper.
I'm sorry if you're reading this . . .
"... My opposition is that somehow we are going to control the ground by maneuvering ourselves militarily to control the ground as if it's a nation-state. I hear my colleagues talk about the flag of Afghanistan as if Afghanistan is a country. In case anybody has bothered to look at it, it's a loose collection of 121 different sovereign tribes, none of [whom] get along with each other."Discuss amongst yourselves...
Who’s In Charge?This is a real problem. American's under the command of a foreign force, the Canadian's, who are backing off the fight and have no problem letting our soldiers walk the fire is unacceptable. As a father with a son falling under this situaiton I am deeply troubled and feel this should be addresses immediately. Waiting until later this year for the normal rotation to a US Commander is not acceptable. Our US soldiers should fall under a chain-of-command free of foreign commanders at all times and in all places.
The overall commander of ISAF forces in Afghanistan is often called “COMISAF,” or “M4.” The man behind the letters is General Stanley McChrystal. General McChrystal’s boss is General David Petraeus at CENTCOM.
Within Afghanistan there are five Regional Commands: RC-West (lead nation Italy); RC-North (Germany); RC-Capital (France); RC-East (United States); RC-South (UK currently).
In theory, the RCs report directly to Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, an experienced and highly respected commander. In practice they are a herd of cats, lacking unity of effort. The reality is that each command reports back to its own leadership – in Rome, Paris, Berlin or wherever.
Down here in RC-South, the current lead nation is the UK. The British Commander is Major General Nick Carter. Americans, Canadians and others fall under RC-South, which is further broken down into Task Force Helmand (TF-H); TF-Kandahar (TF-K); TF-Uruzgan; TF-Zabul; TF-Fury and TF-Stryker.
The Dutch are lead nation in TF-U. Canadians are lead nation in TF-K. The Tarnak River bridge falls in the general area of TF-K.
Please stay with me. This matters.
And so it goes like this:
Major General Nick Carter (UK) commands RC-South.
Brigadier General Daniel Menard (Canada) commands Task Force Kandahar.
Under BG Menard’s command are three U.S. Battalions and just over 2,800 Canadian forces. (U.S. battalions: 1-12 Infantry Reg.; 2-508th Parachute Infantry Regiment; 97th Military Police Battalion). American combat forces comprise a substantial portion of Menard’s force structure, leaving his command and Canadian civilian leadership open to fair scrutiny, just as American leadership is open to Canadian inquiry. Moreover, while Canada increasingly shies from combat, American units under Canadian command will spill blood under Canadian military leadership that answers to Ottawa.
Kandahar Province is apportioned into battle spaces. As mentioned, TF-Stryker has responsibilities that include Spin Boldak and FOM on Highway 4 that crosses the Tarnak River Bridge. TF-Stryker, however, is not responsible for the bridge itself.
The British Royal Air Force (RAF) is responsible for something called the GDA. The GDA is the Ground Defense Area, and is responsible for security immediately around KAF. By all accounts, the RAF is doing a fine job. The GDA includes the area around the Tarnak River Bridge.
TF-K is responsible for Kandahar, but the specific area of the bridge belongs to the RAF. However, the Bridge itself is guarded not by RAF but by ANP (Afghan National Police) mentored by the American 97th MPs. The 97th is under Canadian command through TF-K. And so, at the time of the attack, TF-K was responsible for the physical security on the bridge itself, while GDA had responsibility for the land around the bridge.
Which Coalition partner has final responsibility for this strategic bridge? Is it the RAF who “own” the ground, or TF-K who mentor the ANP guarding the bridge? If an officer were to say this vital bridge is solely the responsibility of the ANP, his judgment would be deemed unsound.
The Bridge
On Thursday, 4 March, three days after the bombing, traffic was flowing, including the fuel trucks from Pakistan. Normal trade was resuming and cancelled missions restarted. Crucial time was gone.
My Afghan cell phone rang. A British voice at the other end asked if I had time to talk with Brigadier General Hodges at 1710, about two hours later. I said sure.
Then came word that a 5/2 soldier had just been killed and others wounded, so I sat for a while. The soldier’s body was on the way back to KAF and the family apparently had not yet been notified.
At 1710 the meeting with BG Ben Hodges began in his office. A U.S. Naval officer, a British officer from Scotland, BG Hodges and me; I was there to answer only two questions: Which Coalition partner was responsible for the bridge on Monday? And, who is responsible for it now? General Hodges explained a bit about battle spaces. Then he said, squarely, that he, himself was the responsible officer. I didn’t believe him, but did not say so. He insisted that it was his fault. He took that bullet for – who? More to the point, he claimed responsibility for the security of the bridge going forward, knowing he would be under scrutiny. He won my instant respect. I believed he was trying to solve the problem and get on with war fighting. When he took responsibility, I said something like, “That was very courageous, Sir.”
As far as I was concerned, General Hodges ended the matter by taking the bullet, though now I had to summarize for people at home...
Summary of meeting with Brigadier General Ben Hodges: The result was unexpected. General Hodges courageously accepted full responsibility. My respect for him doubled in about 30 seconds. Henceforth, Strykers will "own" the bridge. Bottom line: problem solved. BREAK. Something very important came up tonight [was the death of a Stryker soldier], so will give accounting Friday. The accounting will include an apology from me to General Menard.
In apology to BG Menard, I should not have demanded that he be fired so early in the process, despite that my assertion that he was responsible has proven true. I should never have mentioned hockey, as that created room for a diversion from the central importance. Brigadier General Menard clearly was not the only responsible party for this strategic bridge that his soldiers depend upon. To single out BG Menard was a mistake, despite that he was ultimately responsible for the ANP.
Some hours after the meeting with BG Hodges, after midnight, there was another ramp ceremony at KAF. BG Hodges was there along with many others from Canada, Australia, UK, the US and other countries. A Marine was going home for the last time, alongside the soldier from 5/2 who had been killed earlier in the day. Helicopters and jets were nearly constant, and so loud that I could not hear the chaplain. Just in the background, across the busy runway, in the darkness, was Tarnak River Bridge. Ian Gelig had died there on Monday and been flown home from this same ramp.
Thursday night, two flag-draped coffins were delivered by MRAPs next to the runway. Comrades lifted their coffins onto the C-17. Stryker soldier Anthony Paci, and Marine Nigel Olsen where going home. Hundreds of troops from different nations saluted one last time. The ramp closed and the jet flew into the night.
[Final note: About twenty troops have been killed in Afghanistan during the days since the Tarnak Bridge Bombing. A close source conveyed that Task Force Kandahar, under BG Daniel Menard, will henceforth be tasked with the security for Tarnak River Bridge, and that Task Force Stryker and the RAF are not responsible for the bridge.]
Labels: Common Sense, GWOT, Leadership, Warriors