Labels: Angels, Warriors

Free Range International has a great analysis by "babatim" of the Marjah offensive.

I have been back in America for the past week and it is obvious my prediction that Marjah would unfold in the same manner as the Now Zad fight of last summer was too optimistic.  I still think my read on the overall strategy is correct but clearly the fight for Marjah is more difficult and will be more expensive than I had hoped.  What is most alarming about the limited number of casualties we have sustained to date in Marjah is the appearance of skilled Taliban snipers on the battlefield.  As I have pointed out in previous posts there is nothing more intimidating to humans than another human who has the skill and ability to kill.  Bombs, rockets, drones, mines, are all deadly but are easily dealt with psychologically.  Skilled human killers are bad for morale, hunting them down should be an urgent priority.   I thought these cats would have been identified and dealt with before the main assault which clearly did not happen.  Soon when an active sniper is identified all the current rules of engagement will be ignored and the area around that sniper will become a free fire zone.  You cannot let proficient shooters live to fight another day or you will suffer severe consequences to the morale of your assault troops.  The time to modify the ROE to deal with the current sniper threat was about five days ago.  One can only hope it will happen soon.  I’d love to know who those guys are and who trained them – 700 yard head shots?  That is impressive shooting by highly skilled, well trained marksmen.  If we had an intelligence agency worth more than a warm cup of spit we would already know who trained these people, where they were trained and the entire training apparatus would be smoking rubble.   But the chances our intel folks know anything of use about this menace is zero.

Read the rest of the post at Free Range International.

Labels: GWOT, Islamo-Fascists, Leadership, Warriors

I'm always disgusted when I see pictures and video from embeds with the enemy.  That being said, this looks like it will be worth watching.

PBS FRONTLINE - Behind Taliban Lines
On air and online February 23, 2010 at 9:00pm (check local listings)

Late last summer, while reporting a story for FRONTLINE, veteran Afghan journalist Najibullah Quraishi through channels put out word that he would like to interview one of the new Taliban commanders leading a growing insurgency in the country's northern provinces.

It would be the first in a series of contacts that would yield one of the more extraordinary pieces of video journalism in recent memory: Quraishi's 10-day journey among the members of an insurgent cell in northern Afghanistan as they attempt to plant roadside bombs along a highway through northern Afghanistan, which in recent months has become a vital supply route for the United States and NATO.



In this excerpt from Behind Taliban Lines, the militants -- members of an extremist group called Hezb-i-Islami, which fights alongside the Taliban throughout the country -- have holed up in a safe-house near their target and are beginning to build the bombs that they hope will stop an American supply truck and a jeep filled with Afghan police, both of which they plan to subsequently attack with rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. The bombmaker in this scene says he's from Uzbekistan, but Quraishi later digs deeper into his explosives training. "I asked him, 'Where did you learn to make these kind of things?'" Quraishi tells FRONTLINE. "He said, off camera, 'I was trained in Pakistan by some Arabs.' And, when they say Arabs, they mean Al Qaeda, it's clear."

At the time he filmed this scene, Quraishi did not know the target of the attack, but it was clear to him -- as it was throughout his time with the militants -- that it was critical for a Western audience to see for themselves what was taking place here, deepening our understanding of the tactics, training, and mind-set of the insurgents who control vast regions of the country beyond the reach of the central government.

Labels: GWOT, Islamo-Fascists

What might success in Afghanistan look like? Help fund PATROL BASE JAKER to find out.
Project by David Scantling

Labels: COIN, Warriors

Tonight t AC360 had a report U.S. Reviewing Afghanistan Detainee Policy than anyone who is concerned about the war in Afghanistan should watch and read.

This is an on-gong policy that has and will continue to put our troops unnecessarily at risk.  It's my son out there, I can say it.  He's been hit with two IED's while on dismounted patrol by these skum-bags so don't start citing this and that to me unless you are there or have a child there!























The case of Roger Hill, a former Army captain who received a general discharge for his role in the questioning of 12 detainees, prompted CNN's investigation of the 96-hour rule. Those 12 men had worked on his base in Afghanistan, including one who was his trusted interpreter.

Hill was the commander in charge of the Wardak Province in eastern Afghanistan for much of 2008. He said he feared the enemy was tracking his every move and suspected an inside threat.
"Out of a 90-man company, we had 30 wounded, to include two killed in action," he said.

He told CNN that his headquarters sent a team to the base to detect possible spies. The team screened cell phone activity to find out which Afghan civilians working on the base might be working for the Taliban.
"It turned out that it wasn't just one or two or three, but we actually had a full dozen," Hill said.
Hill's trusted interpreter was one of them.

Angry and frustrated that the interpreter might be sabotaging missions, Hill detained all 12 men in a small building on the base. When he took the men in the building, the 96-hour countdown began.

The rule is designed to give the Afghan government control over detainees and avoid abuses like what happened at the Iraqi prison Abu Ghraib in Baghdad.

But Hill said the rule does not work, and many times dangerous suspects are released because there's not enough time to gather evidence.

The other problem, he said, was that the evidence against the 12 men was too sensitive to hand over to the Afghans. Hill was ordered not to share classified intelligence with the Afghans for fear it could be used against U.S. soldiers in future battles.

"So we're in this Catch-22, where they're saying, 'Hey we'll take these guys off your hands, but give us the evidence,'" Hill said. "And I'm saying, 'I can't do that because there are technologies and techniques utilized that I can't sacrifice for this one particular case that will be used again in a fight later on.' 'Well, if you can't give us the evidence, then we can't take these guys off your hands.' So, the clock continues to tick."

As the clock ticked toward the 96-hour NATO deadline, Hill made a decision that would cost him his military career.

"I decided that I needed to break protocol and interrogate them myself," he said. "I took three gentlemen outside, sat them down, walked away, and fired my weapon into the ground three times, hoping that the men inside, left to their own imagination, would think that they really needed to talk."

Hill walked back inside.

"And sure enough, some of the detainees started to talk," Hill said.

What the detainees told him was enough to convince the Afghans to take all 12 men into custody, including Hill's interpreter.

Hill said he felt he had made the correct decision to protect his soldiers, but the Army charged him with detainee abuse, leading to his discharge from the military.

Labels: COIN, Common Sense, GWOT, Leadership

Several years ago one of my subordinate supervisors, we’ll call him Larry, came to me because he felt that one of our employees, we’ll call him Curly, was not pulling his weight and needed to be terminated.

I have to hand it to Larry, he came prepared. He placed several papers and charts in front of me outlining Curly’s poor performance. There was no arguing that Curly was not meeting the standard we set. Larry explained in great detail how Curly couldn’t cut the mustard and we’d be better off letting him go.

I asked Larry to take a seat as I wanted to ask him a few questions to be sure I had a full grasp of the situation before we made any decisions. I told Larry I had six questions I wanted to ask him and then we would make a decision as what to do.

1. Does Curly have the skills and ability to do his job?

2. Does Curly have the tools and resources to do his job?

3. Does Curly know what he is supposed to do?

4. Does Curly know why he is supposed to do his job?

5. Does Curly know how he is doing at his job?

6. Does Curly know the rewards for doing his job and the personal consequences for not doing his job?

By the time I got to question five Larry observed, “I don’t think I have been doing my job.”


PS - Curly is still employed and yes, this is a true story.

Labels: Common Sense, Leadership

A Green Beret's advice: Think COIN, but don't do COIN
BY ROBERT HADDICK

 
After more than eight years of war in Afghanistan and nearly seven in Iraq, the conventional wisdom is that the United States will face more troublesome insurgencies. Even as the U.S. military's involvement in Iraq winds down and as it tries to tame the Taliban in Afghanistan, new insurgency troubles have emerged in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Thus, counterinsurgency will remain the focus of the U.S. military for the foreseeable future.

According to Lt. Col. Brian Petit, commander of the U.S. Army's 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, that conventional wisdom is not quite right. Writing in the journal Special Warfare, Petit, whose battalion served in the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines, argues that the U.S. military should "think COIN" but actually stop doing COIN itself. Petit reminds his readers that counterinsurgency is the proper job for the indigenous security forces, and not for an outsider third party to a conflict, such as the U.S. Army. Petit's advice to the U.S. military? "Think COIN, but practice FID [foreign internal defense]."

Similar to successful ongoing U.S. foreign internal defense missions in Colombia and Africa's Sahel region, the U.S. assistance effort in the Philippines strictly employs the "indirect approach." U.S. soldiers train, advise, and support the local army and police. They remain out of sight and do not participate in direct combat. Even medical assistance visits to remote Philippine villages push Filipino medics and nurses to the foreground with Americans remaining behind the scenes. Petit writes that these visits are planned in consultation with former insurgents who are now reintegrated into society.

If the indirect FID method is so obviously superior to the campaigns that pushed more than 100,000 U.S. soldiers into Iraq and Afghanistan, why hasn't the FID approach been used in those two places? Although at one time broken and corrupt, the Philippines and Colombia at least had a government and army; in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces had to start from zero.
Perhaps as important is how impatient U.S. policymakers frequently are for results, especially for projects they have made into top priorities. But this doesn't work for COIN, as Petit explains:

Tactically, the indirect approach requires clear-eyed recognition that U.S. capacity will be applied through -- and not around -- the host nation. This paradigm seems simple, but it runs counter to U.S. military "can-doism" and requires a long-term view and immense operational patience. The indirect approach does not satisfy appetites for quick, measurable results. By building capacity with host nation security forces and simultaneously applying population-focused, civil-military programs, the indirect approach rarely produces singularly spectacular results in tactical engagements. Measures of effectiveness are often best assessed over time and anecdotally.

President Barack Obama and Gen. Stanley McChrystal are counting on quick, measurable results in Afghanistan, with a withdrawal slated to begin in 17 months. That is not the way Petit and his soldiers made progress in the Philippines.

Labels: COIN, Common Sense, Leadership

Nate and Ken over at 30 Days Through Afghanistan have posted their report after meeting with Colonel Agoglia, the Director of the Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul, Afghanistan to discuss COIN.

Below is my reply to their post Setting the Foundation.

1. Legitimate government organizations exist that are capable of exercising guidance and authority at the national and local levels.
2. The Afghani military/security forces have sufficient leadership and resources to conduct security an law enforcement.
3. The Afghani military/security force are of sufficient size to fulfill security and law enforcement taskings.

Labels: COIN, Leadership

THE WAY AHEAD IN AFGHANISTAN: DOES A SILVER BULLET EXIST? AN ANALYSIS OF GIVING POWER OVER TO THE TRIBES TO ACHIEVE VICTORY.

Labels: COIN, GWOT, Leadership

Jim Gant put this up over at Steven Pressfields blog War and Reality in Afghanistan in response to the Tribal Engagement Tutorial: Mental Models post.  I have a son fighting in Afghanistan so I take his advise pretty seriously.

Labels: COIN, GWOT, Warriors

USAF Technical Sergeants Nathan Gallahan and Ken Raimondi are about to embark on one of the greatest challenge of their lives. They are going out on a 30-day mission throughout Afghanistan to visit every regional command in Afghanistan in 30 days.

We need to get to those areas because that’s where the stories we want to cover are. We want to bring you to those areas with us and share the experience. We want to show you what life is like out there, not just for service members, but for the Afghans we’re all here to free from the grip of war. From past experience, I can tell you the lives of people here are hard. Sleeping in small rooms packed to the ceiling with cots and bunk beds with platoons of soldiers who haven’t showered in a week. But they’re here for a reason; they’re working for a greater good. A greater good I feel isn’t covered enough in the mass media. I want to answer the question, why are we doing this? Why are service members and civilians out there being killed, wounded and suffering miserable lives? And I want to cover it from an “average” perspective, talking about it in normal speak so everyone can see this war as those on the ground see it.

 Checkout their blog: 30 Days Through Afghanistan

PS- Tech Sgt Nathan Gallahan is the son of one of my wife's coworkers.

Labels: COIN, Warriors